cryptonite/Crypto/Cipher/AESGCMSIV.hs
Olivier Chéron 3ae08ed509 Add API to generate a random nonce
This AEAD scheme is compatible with choosing the nonce randomly.
2019-08-25 16:38:08 +02:00

194 lines
6.9 KiB
Haskell

-- |
-- Module : Crypto.Cipher.AESGCMSIV
-- License : BSD-style
-- Maintainer : Olivier Chéron <olivier.cheron@gmail.com>
-- Stability : experimental
-- Portability : unknown
--
-- Implementation of AES-GCM-SIV, an AEAD scheme with nonce misuse resistance
-- defined in <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8452 RFC 8452>.
--
-- To achieve the nonce misuse-resistance property, encryption requires two
-- passes on the plaintext, hence no streaming API is provided. This AEAD
-- operates on complete inputs held in memory. For simplicity, the
-- implementation of decryption uses a similar pattern, with performance
-- penalty compared to an implementation which is able to merge both passes.
--
-- The specification allows inputs up to 2^36 bytes but this implementation
-- requires AAD and plaintext/ciphertext to be both smaller than 2^32 bytes.
{-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-}
{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-}
module Crypto.Cipher.AESGCMSIV
( Nonce
, nonce
, generateNonce
, encrypt
, decrypt
) where
import Data.Bits
import Data.Word
import Foreign.C.Types
import Foreign.C.String
import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr, plusPtr)
import Foreign.Storable (peekElemOff, poke, pokeElemOff)
import Data.ByteArray
import qualified Data.ByteArray as B
import Data.Memory.Endian (toLE)
import Data.Memory.PtrMethods (memXor)
import Crypto.Cipher.AES.Primitive
import Crypto.Cipher.Types
import Crypto.Error
import Crypto.Internal.Compat (unsafeDoIO)
import Crypto.Random
-- 12-byte nonces
-- | Nonce value for AES-GCM-SIV, always 12 bytes.
newtype Nonce = Nonce Bytes deriving (Show, Eq, ByteArrayAccess)
-- | Nonce smart constructor. Accepts only 12-byte inputs.
nonce :: ByteArrayAccess iv => iv -> CryptoFailable Nonce
nonce iv
| B.length iv == 12 = CryptoPassed (Nonce $ B.convert iv)
| otherwise = CryptoFailed CryptoError_IvSizeInvalid
-- | Generate a random nonce for use with AES-GCM-SIV.
generateNonce :: MonadRandom m => m Nonce
generateNonce = Nonce <$> getRandomBytes 12
-- POLYVAL (mutable context)
newtype Polyval = Polyval Bytes
polyvalInit :: ScrubbedBytes -> IO Polyval
polyvalInit h = Polyval <$> doInit
where doInit = B.alloc 272 $ \pctx -> B.withByteArray h $ \ph ->
c_aes_polyval_init pctx ph
polyvalUpdate :: ByteArrayAccess ba => Polyval -> ba -> IO ()
polyvalUpdate (Polyval ctx) bs = B.withByteArray ctx $ \pctx ->
B.withByteArray bs $ \pbs -> c_aes_polyval_update pctx pbs sz
where sz = fromIntegral (B.length bs)
polyvalFinalize :: Polyval -> IO ScrubbedBytes
polyvalFinalize (Polyval ctx) = B.alloc 16 $ \dst ->
B.withByteArray ctx $ \pctx -> c_aes_polyval_finalize pctx dst
foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_polyval_init"
c_aes_polyval_init :: Ptr Polyval -> CString -> IO ()
foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_polyval_update"
c_aes_polyval_update :: Ptr Polyval -> CString -> CUInt -> IO ()
foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_polyval_finalize"
c_aes_polyval_finalize :: Ptr Polyval -> CString -> IO ()
-- Key Generation
le32iv :: Word32 -> Nonce -> Bytes
le32iv n (Nonce iv) = B.allocAndFreeze 16 $ \ptr -> do
poke ptr (toLE n)
copyByteArrayToPtr iv (ptr `plusPtr` 4)
deriveKeys :: BlockCipher128 aes => aes -> Nonce -> (ScrubbedBytes, AES)
deriveKeys aes iv =
case cipherKeySize aes of
KeySizeFixed sz | sz `mod` 8 == 0 ->
let mak = buildKey [0 .. 1]
key = buildKey [2 .. fromIntegral (sz `div` 8) + 1]
mek = throwCryptoError (cipherInit key)
in (mak, mek)
_ -> error "AESGCMSIV: invalid cipher"
where
idx n = ecbEncrypt aes (le32iv n iv) `takeView` 8
buildKey = B.concat . map idx
-- Encryption and decryption
lengthInvalid :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> Bool
lengthInvalid bs
| finiteBitSize len > 32 = len >= 1 `unsafeShiftL` 32
| otherwise = False
where len = B.length bs
-- | AEAD encryption with the specified key and nonce. The key must be given
-- as an initialized 'Crypto.Cipher.AES.AES128' or 'Crypto.Cipher.AES.AES256'
-- cipher.
--
-- Lengths of additional data and plaintext must be less than 2^32 bytes,
-- otherwise an exception is thrown.
encrypt :: (BlockCipher128 aes, ByteArrayAccess aad, ByteArray ba)
=> aes -> Nonce -> aad -> ba -> (AuthTag, ba)
encrypt aes iv aad plaintext
| lengthInvalid aad = error "AESGCMSIV: aad is too large"
| lengthInvalid plaintext = error "AESGCMSIV: plaintext is too large"
| otherwise = (AuthTag tag, ciphertext)
where
(mak, mek) = deriveKeys aes iv
ss = getSs mak aad plaintext
tag = buildTag mek ss iv
ciphertext = combineC32 mek (transformTag tag) plaintext
-- | AEAD decryption with the specified key and nonce. The key must be given
-- as an initialized 'Crypto.Cipher.AES.AES128' or 'Crypto.Cipher.AES.AES256'
-- cipher.
--
-- Lengths of additional data and ciphertext must be less than 2^32 bytes,
-- otherwise an exception is thrown.
decrypt :: (BlockCipher128 aes, ByteArrayAccess aad, ByteArray ba)
=> aes -> Nonce -> aad -> ba -> AuthTag -> Maybe ba
decrypt aes iv aad ciphertext (AuthTag tag)
| lengthInvalid aad = error "AESGCMSIV: aad is too large"
| lengthInvalid ciphertext = error "AESGCMSIV: ciphertext is too large"
| tag `constEq` buildTag mek ss iv = Just plaintext
| otherwise = Nothing
where
(mak, mek) = deriveKeys aes iv
ss = getSs mak aad plaintext
plaintext = combineC32 mek (transformTag tag) ciphertext
-- Calculate S_s = POLYVAL(mak, X_1, X_2, ...).
getSs :: (ByteArrayAccess aad, ByteArrayAccess ba)
=> ScrubbedBytes -> aad -> ba -> ScrubbedBytes
getSs mak aad plaintext = unsafeDoIO $ do
ctx <- polyvalInit mak
polyvalUpdate ctx aad
polyvalUpdate ctx plaintext
polyvalUpdate ctx (lb :: Bytes) -- the "length block"
polyvalFinalize ctx
where
lb = B.allocAndFreeze 16 $ \ptr -> do
pokeElemOff ptr 0 (toLE64 $ B.length aad)
pokeElemOff ptr 1 (toLE64 $ B.length plaintext)
toLE64 x = toLE (fromIntegral x * 8 :: Word64)
-- XOR the first 12 bytes of S_s with the nonce and clear the most significant
-- bit of the last byte.
tagInput :: ScrubbedBytes -> Nonce -> Bytes
tagInput ss (Nonce iv) =
B.copyAndFreeze ss $ \ptr ->
B.withByteArray iv $ \ivPtr -> do
memXor ptr ptr ivPtr 12
b <- peekElemOff ptr 15
pokeElemOff ptr 15 (b .&. (0x7f :: Word8))
-- Encrypt the result with AES using the message-encryption key to produce the
-- tag.
buildTag :: BlockCipher128 aes => aes -> ScrubbedBytes -> Nonce -> Bytes
buildTag mek ss iv = ecbEncrypt mek (tagInput ss iv)
-- The initial counter block is the tag with the most significant bit of the
-- last byte set to one.
transformTag :: Bytes -> IV AES
transformTag tag = toIV $ B.copyAndFreeze tag $ \ptr ->
peekElemOff ptr 15 >>= pokeElemOff ptr 15 . (.|. (0x80 :: Word8))
where toIV bs = let Just iv = makeIV (bs :: Bytes) in iv